“Watching the discussion of the latest Moscow rallies, you notice a strange asymmetry: if the side of the” protesters “discusses real, empirically confirmed events of the last weeks, then the side of the” loyalists “is for the most part not at all interested in what is happening here and now, but immediately surrenders to the super-theme of the collective historical imaginary” – writes Victoria Faibyshenko, Ph.D. on his Facebook page .
“Instead of peaceful candidates for municipal deputies who, with a touch of tragicomicism, are trying to register the collected signatures, this historical imagination is the bloody shadows of Grinevitsky and Vera Zasulich, and almost the count Palen. It turns out ridiculous – you see Ivan Kalyaev being carried out on the couch. Attempt running in the city’s elections seems like a black hole sucking in order and transforming it into chaos, but if we don’t talk about trolls and bots, for this type of reaction, as if it doesn’t need to be reconciled with reality, there is a constellation of historicity, which has developed in the minds of many, many people in recent years and summarizes for them the results of the last century and even the meaning of history in general.
And this is really interesting. The construction seems to me like this.
A common narrative of one’s own history includes an unhealthy trauma of origin: a “bad revolution” is mechanically separated from the “good state” generated by it. The red terror of the revolution is terrible (it is difficult to disagree – it is really terrible), but the state terror in the USSR, which is its ideological and structural extension, is beneficial or at least necessary.
Revolution is a dead end event that brings down all the possibilities of a “normal life.” It is terror without a state. Much more complex events are pulled under this image of the revolution – for example, the collapse of the Soviet project and the collapse of the Soviet system in the nineties. At the same time, the revolution combines the features of the fall, the punishment for the fall and fatum at the same time. A revolution is the end of all history, and history is continuously ending. In fear of the revolution, people recognize the state as the sole bearer and determinant of the norm, but it is the extraordinary state generated by the revolution that is the transcendental Cheka, in which the function of revolutionary terror is converted into the function of counter-revolutionary terror.
The state is now just an organ of permanent counter-revolution. His actions, by definition, are extraordinary: it can no longer be said that “the law follows from a state of emergency” – from a state of emergency follows the need to constantly produce a state of emergency.
This is the problem – for the counter-revolutionary state, the law itself becomes the agent of the revolution. For example, the statutory opportunity to elect is revolutionary, and obstructing the enforcement of the law is a struggle against the revolution. The fact that the law itself was adopted at the previous stage of the fight against the revolution does not matter – it is important that the law ensures the regularity, “non-emergency” action, and this makes the action revolutionary.
So we find ourselves in a world in which there is no difference between the mundep Rusakova and the sailor Zheleznyak. “